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WISH LIST
WILDERNESS ENDGAME IN THE BLACK HILLS
NATIONAL FOREST

ROBERT WELLMAN CAMPBELL

the top on another Stroh's" as he brooded. The
Forest Service had just recommended increasing its Wilderness acres from 18 million to
33 million, or about a sixth of its 190 million
acres. Foreman wished for much more, and he
regretted that conservationists like himself had
been moderate in their demands and tactics.
By 1980 a disgusted Foreman had "loosened
his tie" all the way back to New Mexico, out of
the Wilderness Society, and into Earth First!, a
radical new environmental group that was best
known for advocating sabotage of logging and
construction projects. As Foreman told this
story in his autobiography, Confessions of an
Eco-Warrior, RARE II was the last straw'!
Around the same time, South Dakota congressman Jim Abdnor also held a RARE II
postmortem, but in a lighter mood. Meeting
with environmental activists in his Rapid
City office, including Sierra Clubber Sam
Clauson, who related this story years later, the
Republican congressman lit a cigar, put his feet
up on his desk, and asked without much care,
"Now what the hell are we going to do about
this wilderness thing?" The Black Hills, lying
in Abdnor's "West River" district of western
South Dakota, were to get their first official

In January 1979 Dave Foreman loosened his
tie, propped his cowboy boots up on his desk,
and brooded awhile on RARE II. In a second
try at Roadless Area Review and Evaluation
(RARE), the u.s. Forest Service had just spent
two years deciding once and for all how much
of its undeveloped land should be designated
Wilderness. To Foreman, a Washington executive of the Wilderness Society, RARE II tasted
of bitter defeat, and he lonesomely "popped
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Wilderness. There was some question how to
name it-after a military explorer, a Lakota
holy man, or a conservationist governor-and
though Abdnor was not enthusiastic about an
Indian name, he could accept anything. RARE
II had come out satisfactorily for Abdnor, but
he had bigger fish to fry as he worked toward
his 1980 campaign to unseat Senator George
McGovern. 2
Two very different reactions from two different perspectives. Dave Foreman, having little
to do with South Dakota, typifies the national
reaction: angry rejection from both sides. But
the reaction in the Black Hills region was probably closer to Abdnor and the environmentalists: some interest, some controversy, but also
some rather cool satisfaction. This article
looks at RARE II from the latter perspective,
to shed a different light on the sausage-making
of wilderness legislation. 3 This illuminates two
issues in particular. First, as a very small state in
both population and in attitude, South Dakota
provides a useful example of state-federal tension in environmental politics. Who would call
the shots in this case, D.C. or S.D.? Second, as
a western area developed to a level more typical
of the East and of the nation as a whole, the
Black Hills provide a view into how a postindustrial America might think about the nature
in its own well-worked back yard. The question
is whether we believe in redemption for landwhether nature heals or nature is what was
there before the wound. Do we believe our land
can revert even to "go-back wilderness," or do
we see development as a one-way street?4
RARE II was meant to settle the political
contest that had been fought over wilderness
since 1964, as the endgame to decide once
and for all the winners and losers among
federal lands. RARE II was a modified version of the process dictated by the National
Environmental Policy Act of 1970, which by
the time of RARE II was already a well-practiced set piece within the broader politics of
environmentalism. These NEPA contests were
not just about the specific policy questions at
hand; they were also strategic, symbolic plays
in the never-ending contest over the nation's

public lands. Partly for this reason, the case
of the Black Hills is interesting less for its
unsurprising result-Wilderness status for the
Norbeck Wildlife Preserve-than for how the
political game played out.
PREGAME

(1874-1977)

The historical background of the Black Hills
is beyond our scope, but a few points are relevant. The first is just how developed the Black
Hills were. George Custer's 1874 invasion triggered a powerful, long-term transformation of
the landscape. Immigrants were busy building
mines, towns, farms, sawmills, and most importantly, roads for almost a quarter century before
the creation of the Black Hills Forest Reserve
in 1897, later renamed the Black Hills National
Forest. 5 At that point the federal government
assumed control of a working forest, an "estate
with many tenants" who certainly resented
Democrat Grover Cleveland's eleventh-hour
proclamation creating the reserve. 6 The lands
they owned are still private inholdings today.
Federal timber sales began immediately, and
most of the national forest has been repeatedly logged. These "Hills," though actually
old, weathered mountains, have a moderate
topography that makes access to timber quite
easy. And plentiful snowfall and rainfall in the
spring and early summer make the Black Hills a
natural nursery for abundant ponderosa pine.
So this was, and is, a domesticated place.
And yet, like many places, it can give you a fair
impression of wildness. Once off the highway
the slopes block your sight, the pines hush
your hearing, something hits your nose the
right way, and there is some opportunity to get
lost if you cooperate. A unique mix of plants
grows in the Black Hills: northern, western,
and eastern forest species overlap at the far
ends of their ranges, blending with the shortgrass prairie that flows up the valleys from the
plains and becomes quite tallgrass in the Black
Hills' wetter climate.7 And people did act to
preserve these natural qualities, most notably
Peter Norbeck, South Dakota's conservationist
governor and senator. Norbeck created Custer
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State Park, one of the largest state parks in the
nation, as well as what's now called Norbeck
Wildlife Preserve. 8 The Preserve is on national
forest land and includes Harney Peak, the tallest point east of the Rockies at 7,242 feet.
Since World War II the Black Hills economy
has been an interesting contradiction of tourism and extraction. Winnebago campers and
logging trucks; the faces at Rushmore and
the open pit at Homestake Mine; the pretty
and the prolific, tightly intertwined. These
same contradictions pulled the U.S. Forest
Service in opposite directions. Congress formalized this tug-of-war in the Multiple Use
Act of 1960 and the Wilderness Act of 1964.
The Wilderness Act gave the Forest Service
ten years to recommend which of its wild
lands should be managed as official, "big W"
Wildernesses. (Only acts of Congress could
actually create them.) The Forest Service met
this deadline with an effort called the Roadless
Area Review and Evaluation, or RARE. But its
results were criticized, legally challenged, and
ultimately discarded.
Jimmy Carter, an avowed conservationist, took office in 1977. He appointed Rupert
Cutler, a former academic and Wilderness
Society executive, as the assistant secretary of
agriculture with responsibility for the Forest
Service. Cutler disliked the slow, uncertain
process of piecemeal Wilderness designations,
which pleased neither side. He planned a new
review with consistency, proper planning, and
public involvement. He wanted to move as
many lands as possible to either official wilderness or nonwilderness use. When he announced
his ambitious plan in early 1977, wilderness
advocates derisively nicknamed it RARE II,
but the Forest Service quickly Yankee-Doodled
this nickname as the program's official title?
So from Custer to Cutler was just over a
century, with no lands in the Black Hills designated as Wildernesses. Even the Norbeck
Preserve had roads, grazing permits, fences,
campsites, cabins, inholdings, and even a Jeep
concession selling rides to the top of Harney
Peak. The Black Hills was (to paraphrase the
act itself) an area where the earth and its
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community of life were untrammeled by the
Wilderness Act of 1964, where preservation
itself was a visitor who did not remain. Now,
for almost exactly two years, the Forest Service
would look again, in a process divided like an
athletic contest into four quarters, in this case
lasting six months each. This sounds like a
long time, but for evaluating tens of millions of
acres across the continent it was an ambitious
schedule.
FIRST QUARTER: INVENTORY
(SPRING To FALL 1977)

From late spring to fall 1977, Black Hills
National Forest officials inventoried the
region to determine what "road less and undeveloped areas" existed. By late July, Rangers
and Supervisors were revising the list, phoning each other as they pored over maps. By
August the Forest was soliciting public comment through news releases and at least two
informational meetings in Sundance and
Rapid City. Citizens were asked to critique
the draft inventory and to suggest criteria for
judging the road less areas. The Black Hills
Group of the Sierra Club submitted a list of
fifteen roadless areas; fourteen were rejected
and one (Sand Creek) was added to the list of
candidates. lO
Nationally, 227 of these "workshops"
attracted 17,000 people, and with all the
publicity, spurred more than 50,000 public
comments. But the Black Hills National Forest
received only ninety-five written responses.
Those who did show at the Black Hills meetings were given extra time to speak. One Forest
official noted that since RARE I had skipped
over the Black Hills, residents had skipped that
round of public involvement and controversy
in wilderness issues. I I
During September 1977 the Forest office
in Custer and the Regional office in Denver
together evaluated the comments, finalized a
list, and forwarded it to Washington and the
press. Where RARE I had found no roadless
areas, RARE II found four: two in Wyoming
and two in South Dakota.

290

GREAT PLAINS QUARTERLY, FALL 2010

SOUTH

Devilsr_r
NatiONl Monument

o

DAKOTA

1·90
13. 11'1)'al'l

ms KIna.

BLACK
HillS

NATIONAL
FOREST

WYOMING

Rapid City

Norbeck ..'
Preservo{
Crazy Horse +

'1.. ....

a

Custer
(Forest HQ)

o

Town

~
-

."..--_..•

Roadless Area
Forest boundary
(lnholdings not Sh(H'lIn)

- 20 mi.

•

«

FIG. 1. Area map. Map

by the author.

Inyan Kara Mountain was by far the smallest of the four (Fig. 1). This 6,400-foot peak is
a western outlier of the Black Hills with two
square miles of Forest Service land around it.
There were no roads through this area, or even
public roads to this area. While Devils Tower,
thirty miles northwest, is a more spectacular

and well-known landmark, Inyan Kara (probably corrupted Lakota for "stone maker" or "the
stone is made") was part of local lore as the
point of several Indian-European encounters.
On July 22, 1874, Custer's expedition camped
four miles to the east, and the next day Custer
and some of his men climbed the mountain
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FIG. 2. Looking east toward Harney Peak. Nelson Horatio Darton, 1898. Courtesy of U.S. Geological Survey
Photographic Library.

itself. While waiting for the haze of Indian fires
to clear, they chiseled "74 Custer" into stone, as
is visible today.1 2
Sand Creek was the biggest of the four, about
nineteen square miles of steep, forested land
just inside Wyoming. Lying near the edge of
the Black Hills dome, in the northwest corner
of the national forest, this area dropped almost
a half mile over its five-mile run, making it hard
to log profitably. It was locally popular for hunting, snowmobiling, and cross-country skiing.!3
Beaver Park also lay on the edge of the
national forest, but in the northeast near the
busy Spearfish-Rapid City corridor, close to
Interstate 90 and the town of Sturgis. Its name,

like that of the Holy Roman Empire, was a
tangle of historical irony. The Forest Service
named this densely forested "road less area"
after one of its few open areas, located at a
junction of two old roads. The area's gulches
had only intermittent streams, and so presumably no beavers. Instead, local tradition traced
the name to a Mr. Beaver, owner of a sawmill
near the park.14
Norbeck had a different kind of busyness. Its
sixteen square miles lay around Harney Peak,
and in the center of the Black Hills' main tourist attractions. Mount Rushmore was immediately northeast, and the enormous Crazy
Horse sculpture to the southwest. To the south
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FIG. 3. Area attributes and draft environmental impact statement alternatives. Figure by the author.

and southeast lay the popular Custer State
Park with its scenic Needles, tourist highways,
recreational lakes, and other attractions. The
Norbeck roadless area lay inside the Norbeck
Wildlife Preserve, created in 1920 and named
for the hallowed Senator Norbeck.
For the next year and a half these four pieces
of ground were debated, defended, and disparaged, first by the Forest Service.
SECOND QUARTER: THE FOREST SERVICE
EVALUATES (FALL 1977 To SPRING 1978)

Soon after the four areas were chosen as
candidates, Forest Service staff were at work
appraising them in several ways. In the winter
of 1977-78 the local and regional offices were
assigned the task of quantifying the commodity potential, wildness, and political popularity
of each candidate area. These data became
the basis for all future stages of the RARE II
process; they were used to produce the Forest
Service's policy alternatives, to spur public
comments, and ultimately to justify the Forest
Service's proposal to Congress.
Commodity values: National forests produce
wood but also livestock forage, water, energy
and minerals, wildlife habitat, and human

recreation. Documenting these commodities
is what foresters do, so for the most part commodity assessments for RARE II were nothing
new (Fig. 3). One area stood out: Sand Creek.
It had much more total timber than the other
areas, and its timber was already planned for
harvest. It also fed many times more cattle than
the other areas combined.
Wildness: How on earth do you quantify wildness? As in any theological question you return
to a sacred text, in this case the Wilderness Act
of 1964. Its wording was scrutinized for guidance, and four phrases were picked out as criteria. A Wilderness's four "requisite attributes"
would be natural integrity, apparent naturalness, outstanding opportunities for solitude, and
outstanding opportunities for primitive recreation. The Forest Service's Wilderness Attribute
Rating System (WARS) rated each attribute
from 1 to 7 and added them; thus a perfect
WARS score was 28. The average WARS score
nationally was 18,48. The Black Hills National
Forest's scores are in Figure 3. South Dakota's
areas (Norbeck and Beaver Park) led with 21
and 20, while Wyoming's areas (Inyan Kara and
Sand Creek) lagged at 15 and 14.15
Social analysis: The roadless areas' political
values (the Forest Service called them "social"
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values) were even harder to quantify than wildness. Again the task was approached by breaking it up. The heart of the social analysis was a
list of interest groups; unnamed Forest officers
(apparently at the District level) estimated,
in narrative and a numerical scale, how badly
each group wanted each road less area to be designated one way or the other, and why (Fig. 4),
The order of support echoed WARS: Norbeck,
Beaver Park, Inyan Kara, Sand Creek. But in
this case the big gap fell between Norbeck and
the rest; people apparently did not appreciate
or desire Beaver Park's wildness.!6
The narrative portion mostly explained the
obvious: interest groups opposed Wilderness
designation for any area that they wanted
to benefit from nonwilderness management.
Many of these were anticipated future benefits,
but some, such as grazing, were already being
enjoyed. Keep in mind that these were Forest
Service perceptions; the social analysis essentially described what political flak the Forest
Service expected from various allocations. This
analysis reveals several points: that the envi-

ronmentalists were politically isolated but their
opponents were well allied, that public reaction was really about wilderness in general and
not specific areas, and that the Forest Service
revealed a particular view in the terms it used.
First, on the term "multiple use": The Multiple
Use-Sustained Yield Act of 1960 expressly
stated that "multiple use" included wilderness.
Environmentalists likewise stressed that multiple use never meant "every use on every acre,"
and that wilderness itself served various purposes, For these reasons the Forest Service was
often careful to speak of wilderness vs. "other
uses:' But notice that in setting up this numerical scale, the Forest Service placed "wilderness"
and "multiple use" at opposite poles. South
Dakotans, including Representative Abdnor,
often said "multipurpose" instead of "multiple
use," a subtle distinction; a drawer of tools is not
multipurpose but a single 5-in-1 pocketknife is.
In practice, the phrases were used interchangeably as meaning "not wilderness:' Only a "Wise
Use Act" could hand preservationists a deeper
rhetorical defeatP
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Second, outside of Norbeck, "environmentalists/preservationists" had few allies.
Nonmotorized recreationists for Inyan Kara
were the only other pro-wilderness group in the
table (and "little interest expressed" was noted
even here). Potential allies in research, fishing,
and nongame wildlife were almost unheard.
Environmentalists were also perceived as spreading their support, whereas timber and motorized
recreation were sometimes noted as picking and
choosing, accepting Norbeck as a "compromise
area ... to get what they want in other areas."
But we should note here that generalized,
not site-specific, reactions were the rule. Sand
Creek's grazing was ten times greater than
Inyan Kara's, but the same reaction from ranchers was expected. In fact, those two areas had
the most and least total resources, but their
overall support was similar.
Finally, in contrast to the isolated environmentalists, the social analysis portrayed
the commodity interests as tightly allied. In
this account city hall and the Chamber of
Commerce were deemed identical in their sentiments. For "elected officials," three times the
unnamed Forest official simply wrote, "Same as
[Chamber of Commerce and civic groups]."
The officer's "overall" perceptions of local
sentiment closely match the Chamber-town
hall consensus. These were sharper than the
(admittedly simple) averages shown in Figure 3,
with Norbeck rated high and the Wyoming
areas at the lowest level. Beaver Park was again
in the middle. The officer also added notes to
each, labeled "Sense of Local Control":
[Norbeck:] The local public presently views
the R.A. as a "Wilderness" and wants it
to remain that way. Unless the area is
designated as WildernessL] or M.U. with
stringent controls on development and
vehicular travel, the local public will feel
that Government and outside pressure
groups have made the decision and their
input was not used.
[Inyan Kara, Sand Creek, and Beaver Park:]
General feeling ... [is] that Gov't will make

the decision regardless of local input. Gov't
is influenced by big city or eastern pressure
groups who know nothing of the local situation. This feeling will be reinforced if the
R.A. is designated as wilderness.

In other words, outsiders are environmentalists who want new Wildernesses; locals want
Norbeck designated only because it is already
an unofficial wilderness anyway. Local Forest
Service personnel may have shared this sense,
but the documents are silent on tensions
within the Forest Service. The major "interest
group" omitted from the social analysis was, of
course, the Forest Service itself.
By February of 1978, almost a year after the
start of RARE II, the Black Hills National
Forest had finished its analyses and shipped
them up the line to Denver and Washington.
Other information trickled in; in March Forest
Service lawyers opined on Norbeck's status,
and in June the Department of Energy assessments circulated. In June the Forest Service
published the RARE II draft environmental
impact statement as required by law. The main
statement, a thick, dry tome, formally proposed
the national program, while state supplements
described individual areas.
The task of a draft environmental impact
statement is to describe an area, propose alternative plans for it, and assess how each alternative would change the area, both physically and
socially. Figure 3 shows how each alternative
allocated the Black Hills areas. Three alternatives (E, F, and G) "rounded out" the National
Wilderness Preservation System with low,
medium, and high levels of ideal landform,
ecosystem, and wildlife representation. Two
alternatives (C and I) took the obvious tack
of balancing wilderness benefits against commodity costs. And one alternative (H) followed
local politics.
Unlike an ordinary environmental impact
statement covering one project in one place,
this national or "programmatic" environmental impact statement served less as a factual
analysis and more as an enormous paper
ballot.
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THIRD QUARTER: PUBLIC COMMENT
(SPRING To FALL 1978)
And so the process had been plopped, heavily, back into the public's court. Forest Service
chief John McGuire described this phase of
RARE II as a kind of studious outing: "The
public will have the field season of 1978 to
check the accuracy of these data and present
their recommendations." Some of this civic
tramping of the grassroots may have occurred,
but it was lost in the publicity machines that
buried the Forest Service in bales of homogenized "astroturf" balloting. For all U.S. roadless areas, the 1977 inventory round of public
involvement reaped 50,000 comments. By contrast, the 1978 harvest topped a third of a million signatures. A special clearinghouse was set
up in Salt Lake City to count all the comments
and summarize their contents. Forest Service
personnel from around the country, including
the Black Hills, were moved temporarily to
Salt Lake to meet the November 1 deadline for
processing comments. IS
Regarding the Black Hills areas, after getting thirty-four comments in the inventory

round, the Forest Service probably heard from
over 1,500 people in this round. (Since most
people commented on all four areas, over 6,000
"signatures" were recorded.) Comments ran
more than 20-to-1 against Wilderness designation. Ninety-three percent were form letters
(petitions, preprinted forms, etc.). Figure 5
depicts the comments by origin, format, and
preference.
The most obvious pattern is that Inyan Kara
and Sand Creek were twins, as are Beaver Park
and Norbeck. As the internal social analysis
predicted, overall political response was general, not site-specific. Personal letters favored
Wilderness by about 3 to 2, but form letters
almost purely opposed Wilderness for every
road less area, and the forms produced far more
"signatures." The Salt Lake processors noted
that pro-Wilderness letters tended to name
specific areas but anti-Wilderness letters named
entire states or forests.
Where did the letters about the Black Hills
National Forest come from? The Forest Service
recorded whether each comment came from
inside or outside the state of the area it commented on. For this Forest, split between two
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states, this requires a bit of syllogism. First, the
Wyoming areas received very few comments
from Wyoming. Second, it is very unlikely
that a South Dakotan or Wyomingite would
comment on areas lying just across the border
but not on the areas within their own state. So
South Dakota's outs tate letters were not from
Wyoming. Therefore all four areas must have
received hundreds of letters from outside the
two-state area. But from where?
Among the stacks of cards and letters,
the staff in Salt Lake noticed over a dozen
organized campaigns targeted at the Rocky
Mountain Region (Colorado, Wyoming, South
Dakota, Nebraska, and Kansas). Almost all
of them opposed Wilderness. Two campaigns
were Wyoming-wide. Another "extensive post
card form campaign" supported nonwilderness
for all four Black Hills areas; many of these
cards were hand-annotated: "especially Sand
Creek." Another card campaign targeted Sand
Creek alone. A "large number" of forms came
from Chicago, in four versions for four of the
Region's Forests, including the Black Hills
National Forest. These were formatted like
ballots with checkboxes, but they were almost
uniformly checked nonwilderness.
Several states had pro-Wilderness campaigns
(''Alternative W"), but apparently South Dakota
had none; Wyoming did, but proposed nonwilderness for its two Black Hills areas.
The public comments partly belied the
Forest Service's social analysis. In this stage
locals did oppose Wilderness, but for all four
areas. And there were indeed "outside ... big
city or eastern" pressure groups, but far from
being environmentalist, they were almost
purely anti-Wilderness.
FOURTH QUARTER: FOREST SERVICE
RECOMMENDATIONS
(NOVEMBER-DECEMBER 1978)
The Forest Service wanted its RARE II
recommendations to be ready when the new
Congress convened in January 1979 so that
areas allocated to nonwilderness could be
"released" and utilized that year. To do this it

had to start acting before the October 1, 1978,
deadline for public comments. In September
the chief of the Forest Service directed his
Regional Foresters to adjust boundaries of the
areas if they sensed that doing so would "minimize resource conflicts." This meant removing
commodity areas from proposed Wildernesses,
since nobody opposes a proposed Wilderness
because it is slightly too small. The Black Hills
areas did not change.
Assistant Supervisor Frank Smedley handled
RARE II for the Black Hills National Forest, as
head of Lands and Recreation. In late October
1978, as soon as the public comments came in
from Salt Lake City, he met with his District
Rangers in the basement of the Supervisor's
office in Custer to review the comments and the
previously gathered data. By the 27th he was in
the Regional office in Denver conferring with
officials from the Regional office, state governments, and other national forests.
Regional Forester Craig Rupp had only
about two weeks to make decisions on almost
400 roadless areas. Even the Forest Service
admitted that RARE I had lacked consistency
between Regions, so for RARE II, every Region
had to follow a standardized decision-making
process (Fig. 6). This new process did not consider one area at a time, and it did not choose
one alternative from the draft environmental
impact statement and apply it across the entire
Region. Instead, the new process was a kind of
algorithm that combined Alternatives C and
I (basically, the alternatives that emphasized
commodity values and wilderness values), and
then ran that result through a series of "filters"
that could move areas from one category to
another. These filters were a fascinating ranking of Forest Service priorities, since obviously
the later the filter the greater its power. For
example, Alternatives C and I disagreed on
three of the Black Hills areas, so they went to
the middle status of "Further Planning"-but
that didn't matter because the next step put all
four areas into nonwilderness anyway, because
more than 90 percent of public comments
had wished so. In later filters, Beaver Park and
Norbeck moved to Wilderness in order to put
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6. Decision-making process. Figure by the author.

some Black Hills Pine Forest into the National
Wilderness Preservation System, but then both
areas dropped to Further Planning because
they had mineral potential. And that was the
Region's recommendation: Further Planning
for the two South Dakota areas, and nonwilderness for the two Wyoming areas. 19
In Washington, during the week of Thanksgiving 1978, Forest Service chiefJohn McGuire
and the Regional Foresters met with Assistant
Secretary Cutler and other Department of
Agriculture staff to make the final Forest
Service recommendations. McGuire and

Cutler were supposed to consider "national
issues and needs, such as energy," as McGuire
later said. The United States W~'S :uffering
through inflation and an energy crisis, and the
national forests were to contribute more oil and
timber in order to bring energy and housing
costs down. So one of their main goals----the
original intent of RARE II, after all-was to
move Further Planning areas one way or the
other. 2o
McGuire and Cutler moved Beaver Park
to Wilderness and Norbeck to nonwilderness.
They did so for a commodity: not energy or
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timber, but game animals. The Forest Service
acted to defend its own decades-long interest
in the Norbeck Wildlife Preserve, namely the
"production" of wildlife. As a Forest official
told the Rapid City Journal, Norbeck was passed
over "because Federal law already mandates
its preservation for wildlife," implying that
Wilderness designation was superfluous. (As we
will see, the Forest would eventually claim that
Wilderness status would conf1ict with Norbeck's
wildlife mandate.) And once Norbeck was
eliminated, Washington still wanted some
Black Hills ponderosa forest in the wilderness
system, so Beaver Park was in. 21
The final recommendations of Cutler and
the Forest Service, unaltered by the secretary
of agriculture, were announced on January 4,
1979, with the release of the final environmental impact statement. Ninety days of political
"interagency review" was to follow before the
president would formally send his requests to
Congress, but the Forest Service's processRARE II itself-was over.
SUDDEN DEATH: THE 96TH CONGRESS

(1979-1980)
South Dakotans immediately threw out the
Forest Service's final RARE II recommendation of Wilderness for Beaver Park and nonwilderness for Norbeck. Ninety days later, when
the president sent his final list to Congress,
Norbeck was on it and Beaver Park was out. Let
us look at how this reversal came about.
The Rapid City Journal had immediately
turned against Beaver Park. Paul Riley, outdoors reporter for the Journal, filed stories such
as "Beaver Park Walk Shows Little Signs of
Wildlife" and "Wilderness Area Rates High
for Mineral Potential." "The Forest Service has
chosen Beaver Park," Riley summarized in a
news article, "even though the Norbeck area
scored higher on the wilderness attribute rating
system, showed no potential for gas and oil and
had stronger local support." He combined this
position on Beaver Park with criticism of wilderness in general, writing in an editorial that
"roadless means lifeless," because the forest

needed management to keep ponderosa in
check. 22
State politicians, many of them just taking
office, also rejected the Forest Service decision.
This included the new governor, his Wildlife,
Parks, and Forestry Commission, and the entire
congressional delegation.23
The local Sierra Club, which had led the
pro-Wilderness cause back in 1977 by recommending fifteen roadless areas, now split over
what to do about the last two chances. The
club strongly supported Norbeck, according to
the Journal, but officially took no position on
Beaver Park because some members wanted to
push for two Wildernesses while others worried that Norbeck might be left out. 24 Norbeck
had been the chapter's founding cause; they
had formed in 1972 as the ad hoc Committee
for Preservation of Harney Peak to defeat a
proposed tramway. Conservationists had also
opposed a sale of timber from the Preserve in
the early 1970s. 25 By 1979, according to a later
Forest Service document,
[plrobably the recommendations for Beaver
Park and Norbeck would have stood as presented in the EIS [environmental impact
statement] were it not for the Sierra Club
in Rapid City. Members thought it would
be nice to have a Beaver Park Wilderness,
although they had never considered the possibility, but they were disappointed that the
Norbeck area was not to be accorded the protection of wilderness designation. Working
with the procedure "to bring pressure on
Bergland," members began a strong lobbying effort, sponsored a letter-writing campaign, and ultimately persuaded Governor
Wollman, Senators McGovern and Abdnor,
and Congressman Abourezk to support wilderness designation for Norbeck. 26
This unsigned document has some chronology wrong, and may overestimate the club's
influence on elected officials, but it is consistent with the Journal's account. One chapter
member later said that they reacted with "a
sigh of relief" to the April 1979 decision to des-
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ignate only Norbeck. "We should have fought
hard for both of them," said founding member
Sam Clauson in hindsight, but they were green
and did not appreciate how final RARE II
would prove to be-there had been a RARE I,
after all, then RARE II, so maybe there would
be more.27
And the local Forest Service-what was
their attitude? The documents leave only hints.
The Forest's public information officer distanced the local Forest Service from the initial
announcement: "It's important to remember
that [this] decision came out of Washington."
The big Thanksgiving meeting in Washington
contravened the Black Hills public's well-documented preference by choosing Beaver Park,
but it is unclear where in the Forest Service
this impulse originated-in Custer, Denver,
or Washington. Wherever it arose, it was
overcome by public pressure between January
and April 1979. A later Forest document said
merely that in this period "the anticipated
management conflicts were found not to exist."
But these "conflicts" did exist, and would be an
issue through this Wilderness's legislative history.2S
Making a Wilderness requires an act of
Congress, and this act proved just slightly
tricky. Carter's RARE II request was not
handled in mass as an omnibus bill, so South
Dakota's western congressman and senior
senator each submitted bills covering South
Dakota only. Once Norbeck had been chosen,
two issues complicated this legislation: how to
reconcile the new Wilderness with the existing wildlife Preserve and what to name the
Wilderness.
The minor issue was the name. The roadless area had been "Norbeck," or "the Norbeck
Core," after the Preserve. Once it was a proposed
Wilderness, the Forest Service distinguished
it from the Preserve by calling it Harney Peak
Wilderness. But Senator McGovern introduced
a bill in September 1979 naming it Black Elk
Wilderness. This Lakota holy man was made
famous by John Neihardt's book Black Elk
Speaks, which had just been staged as a play
at the Kennedy Center and was on its way to
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FIG. 7. The trail to Harney Peak, ca. 19205. Courtesy
of Black Hills National Forest Historical Collection,
Case Library, Black Hills State University.

Broadway. Fully half of McGovern's floor comments had to do with Black Elk and his visit to
Harney Peak ("A spot, I might add, at which I
chose to rejuvenate myself after the exertion
of the primaries and Democratic Convention
by which I was nominated as a candidate for
the Presidency"). It was on Harney Peak, in
the climax of Neihardt's book, where Black Elk
recited "Black Elk's Prayer" and was rewarded
with an affirmative rain shower. Abdnor held
to "Harney Peak Wilderness," noting that "a
large majority" of his constituents preferred
that name. The Forest Service explicitly took
no position. 29
The more substantial issue in the legislation was how to reconcile the existing Wildlife
Preserve with the new Wilderness. The two
seemed surprisingly incompatible.
In 1920 Congress had declared the Preserve
"set aside for the protection of game animals
and birds and ... a breeding place [thereforl."
All uses, even wilderness, were eventually
judged against that single standard. A 1927
master plan, in effect until the 1970s, called for
fire suppression and for timber cutting aimed
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at scenic enhancement, brush disposal, thinning, and insect and disease control. Grazing
was allowed with no increase in herd size.
Campgrounds, picnic areas, and cabins were
permitted when deemed consistent with wildlife goals. A stone lookout tower adorned the
peak. Hunting was allowed and regulated by
the state. Congress even permitted the state "to
erect and maintain a good substantial fence,
enclosing [the Preserve] in whole or in part,"
but no such fence was ever built.
The exception to all this management was
the Upper Pine Creek Research Natural Area,
1,190 acres of "virgin timber" just off the peak,
set aside since 1932 as a scientific comparison
to cutover lands, "so that present and future
generations can see it as it was when the
Indians used the Black Hills for their hunting
grounds."3o
How would Wilderness designation affect
this use of the land? The Forest Service
persistently couched this issue in legal language, even though the real conflict was not
legal. Congress had created the Preserve, and
Congress could alter or abolish it at will. The
whole point of a Wilderness designation, after
all, was to supersede previous land-use plans.
Back in 1978, during the preparation of the
draft environmental impact statement, the
Forest Service's Office of General Counsel had
advised Black Hills National Forest officials
that "[ilt is conceivable that wilderness designation of the refuge or a portion thereof could
be contrary to the intent of the legislation
establishing the sanctuary in that activities
to further wildlife and habitat therefore [sic]
may be prevented by wilderness designation."31
And the press release following the initial
announcement had echoed: "Norbeck was
[allocated] to nonwilderness because wilderness classification would conflict with the wildlife purposes for which the area was set aside in
1920 by Congress." A later Black Hills National
Forest document added that Wilderness status
might even have conflicted with the 1,190 acres
of virgin Research Natural Area. 32 These were
the conflicts "found not to exist" when the
administration flipped Norbeck and Beaver

Park in April 1979, but they did exist, and they
took almost two years to iron out in the legislative process.
The real rub was not fire suppression, grazing, commercial logging, or even the substantial
stone tower at the apex of the new Wilderness.
It was that the Forest Service and others were
concerned about the survival of wildlife in this
new Wilderness. This should seem odd: why
would wildlife die in a Wilderness? Well, just
as Custer State Park had been restocked with
bison, elk, beaver, and other animals at its
establishment, the Preserve was stocked with
Rocky Mountain goats, perhaps suggested by
the rock outcroppings. An exotic species, they
required human manipulation of their habitat
to thrive, especially in an era of fire suppression. By the 1970s there were an estimated
300 to 400 goats in the herd, centered roughly
where the Wilderness was proposed. Heavy
foraging of favored foods like chokeberry and
serviceberry had caused "poor plant conditions," according to the Supervisor, and goat
and elk bedding areas becoming infested with
parasites. Controlled burning of a thousand
acres or so, and possibly selective cutting,
would open up the dense forest, stimulate grass
and bushes, and create more bedding sites.
Without continued improvements to the goats'
forage and habitat, the Forest Service expected
the goat herd to decline, by how much no one
knew. 33
It came down to this: which law would
have precedence-the 1920 Preserve statute,
or the Wilderness Act? In September 1979 the
Black Hills National Forest Supervisor urged
removing the proposed Wilderness from the
wildlife preserve, but providing for Preservelike maintenance of the mountain goat habitat. Later that month McGovern introduced
his Wilderness bill (the same bill proposing
the Black Elk name) in a speech warmly
positive toward wilderness, or at least the
establishment of this particular Wilderness:
"[Ilt is historically, morally, and spiritually so
very right that we do so." This bill agreed with
the Black Hills National Forest Supervisor:
"The wilderness ... shall be administered ...
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in accordance with (1) the provisions of the
Wilderness Act ... [and] (2) the provisions
of the Act of June 5, 1920." In his speech
McGovern called for "biologic manipulation"
of goat and elk habitat, particularly prescribed
burning. 34
Three months later, on the floor of the
House, Jim Abdnor gave a very different
speech:
The large majority of my constituency reacts
negatively to the very concept of wilderness . . . . They are violently opposed to
the continued expansion of the authority
of the Federal Government, [particularly
increased] control of a basic and precious
resource; that is, our land ....
I sincerely resent the holier-than-thou
attitude many of our urban cousins take
in suggesting that they know better than
our local rural people. . . . I am a staunch
supporter of multiple-use management of
our public lands-not just in some cases or
even in most cases, but in virtually every
case ....
But not in this case; Abdnor proposed the
same area for Wilderness that McGovern had.
And interestingly, he changed McGovern's
text to hew more closely to strict wilderness
management; the law establishing the Preserve
would apply only "to the extent that they
are not inconsistent with the provisions of
the Wilderness Act." Abdnor referred to this
explicitly in his speech: "vegetative manipulations will not be performed to increase wildlife
populations."35
In May 1980 the associate chief of the
Forest Service testified to a Senate committee,
apparently in support of Abdnor's text, that
"habitat manipulation [was] not consistent
with the proposed wilderness designation." The
Wilderness could still have Preserve status, he
said, but "the wilderness designation would
take precedence." Yet McGovern tried again
in September 1980, amending Abdnor's bill so
as to require administration of the Wilderness
"in accordance with" the Preserve statutes,
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and again calling for "continuation of wildlife
management."36
By then McGovern and Abdnor were in
the last weeks of a campaign for McGovern's
Senate seat. McGovern lost that campaign,
and McGovern lost this minor skirmish over
the Wilderness. Jimmy Carter signed the bill,
now Public Law 96-560, just before Christmas
1980, and the House-Senate conference committee had settled on the Abdnor language
supported by the Washington Forest Service:
the Preserve statutes applied only "to the
extent they are not inconsistent with the provisions of the Wilderness Act."
So what was this disagreement about? The
side issue was whether the new Wilderness
would remain part of the Norbeck Preserve.
South Dakotans did not want a doughnutshaped scrap as a memorial to their former
governor. This was avoided by keeping the
Wilderness nominally within the Preserve.
(This meant, by the way, an almost perfect fivelayer concentric "wedding cake" of preservation in the Black Hills: forest, national forest,
Preserve, Wilderness, and Research Natural
Area. Elevation equaled protection.)
But the heart of the Preserve/Wilderness
question was of course that several actors shied
away from full wilderness for the Wilderness.
That would mean abandoning the wildlife to
nature and accepting whatever "game crop"
resulted. It also meant abandoning the goats.
They were never fully wild-not just because
people introduced them, but because people had
to help them survive in those numbers. The goats
needed openings in the ponderosa, and usually
one of three things will create these openings:
loggers, pine beetles, or fire. The politics of
wilderness is all about letting the beetles and
fire do it rather than the chainsaws. By changing from Preserve to Wilderness, Norbeck's core
became "a breeding place" not only for game but
for beetles and fires. Abdnor, just before passage
of his bill, gave his constituents assurances on
eight wilderness-related issues; fire, beetles, and
logging were numbers one, two, and three.
When faced with this issue, McGovern
the East River environmentalist Democrat
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tried for looser rules allowing more management, but Abdnor the West River "wise use"
Republican stuck tight to the Wilderness Act.
Viewing this as a management issue, this is
surprising. Perhaps just as Nixon could go to
China, Abdnor could afford to do this because,
as he said, "[Mly constituents know that I am
anything other than a wild-eyed, environmentalist rabble-rouser." But viewing this as
part of the fight over future Wilderness designations, the contradiction disappears. The
standard for managing a Wilderness, some have
argued, is the same standard that any proposed
Wilderness must meet. So a "purity policy,"
demanding strict management, is one way to
keep the National Wilderness Preservation
System small. Abdnor indeed stated, "It is my
intent that this legislation will close the book
on wilderness deliberations in my state."37
CONCLUSIONS

RARE II was certainly not the end of wilderness politics in the Black Hills. But let us
pause here and, like Foreman and Abdnor with
their feet on their desks, consider for a moment
what we have learned, first about wilderness
purity.
During the RARE II process, South Dakotans
tended to speak of "which area" in the Black
Hills would be selected. 38 This may have been
political realism, but it also reflected their
tendency to discuss Wilderness designation as
an honor or award rather than as a land-use
plan. They saw the designation as descriptive,
not prescriptive. This would imply an attitude
of purism, as if the area with the fewest marks
against its virginity should win.
But oddly the debate didn't turn in that
direction; it is hard to find arguments based
on purity. The discussion of Norbeck's goats,
road, and tower was not whether they would
detract from a possible Wilderness designation,
but whether the designation would detract
from them. There was a striking consensus, at
least for lands with a modest human footprint,
that the land heals itself back to wilderness.
Particularly in this high-rainfall landscape

where an ungraded, ungraveled road was often
the worst disqualifier. People actually watched
this happen, when the disastrous 1972 flood
that struck Rapid City also washed away many
of Beaver Park's roads.
The national trend, since at least the 1920s,
has been designation of ever more imperfect
lands. But another rational concern for antiwilderness activists would be the land healing
back to meet up with that loosening standard, and whether the public will accept this
"secondary virginity" as valid. It happened at
Harney Peak, where dialing back on the human
impact rewilded the place to a small degree.
In this sense it is either fitting or ironic
that the Forest Service classified each roadless area by its "Bailey-Kuchler ecosystem"
(Fig. 3). The reference to geographer August
Kuchler is remarkable because his system, often
assumed to describe a region's natural state at
some point in the past, in fact describes a kind
of hypothetical future. Kuchler said his map
showed
the vegetation that would exist today if man
were removed ... and if the plant succession after his removal were telescoped into
a single moment. The time compression
eliminates the effects of future climatic
fluctuations, while the effects of man's earlier activities are permitted to stand. The
potential natural vegetation is a particularly
important object of research because it
reveals the biological potential of all sites.
He was, in other words, mapping the entire
United States as a kind of go-back wilderness,
an early cartographic version of the recently
popular "Earth after humans" genre. Perhaps
not what the Forest Service had in mind. 39
The go-back dynamic is slippery. It makes
more lands suitable for protection as Wilderness, or as other kinds of natural preserve, thus
complicating Jim Abdnor's wish to "close the
book on wilderness in South Dakota." But it
also makes more activities permissible within
natural lands by promising a kind of natural
self-mitigation. It is a political pretzel.
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And what did we learn about the politics?
First of all, that the game was indeed a political one. After several denials that public comments would be handled as vote counting, that
is exactly how they were handled, with the vote
counting even formalized in the publicized
decision-making track (Fig. 6). Nationally,
environmentalists were naive to think votes
would not be counted, because this was already
being discussed in the inventory phase, and
the implication was clear: how else could several hundred thousand "inputs" be considered?
Discounted unless judged to be "thoughtful"?
RARE II was accused of being a political decision with a scientific face, but it was really a
political decision with a political face. And
when it was done its formal results were simply
thrown to the arena of ordinary congressional
politics. 40
In the end, Dave Foreman's conclusions
described the Black Hills accurately: the
commodity interests stood firm, the conservationists stood timidly against them, and so
the chosen Wilderness was the area of least
cost. 41 But Jim Abdnor was right, too: South
Dakotans disliked wilderness generally and
Beaver Park distinctly, but the conflict could be
minimized because the opposition was general
and not truly aimed at Norbeck. The Forest
Service played its role in the middle; if it did
less than the environmentalists wished for, it
also did more than the environmentalists could
rally support for. It was national Forest Service
officials, after all, who insisted that Black Hills
ponderosa forest be represented in the National
Wilderness Preservation System, and by the
numbers even Norbeck had only 6 percent of
the public support.
But the main story politically is that this was
definitely not some national imposition upon
the Black Hills. The attempted imposition was
rebuffed in 1979, and every local interest group
came out satisfied. South Dakotans had power,
at least in deciding which area was designated,
and even in the details of how it would be
managed. And yet the local rhetoric was a
drumbeat of the small-state litany: big-state
urban bureaucrats and environmentalists were
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FIG. 8. Abdnor map. Courtesy of South Dakota
State Archives.

going to lock up vast expanses of the Black
Hills. This was the tone in the news coverage,
in the social analyses, in the Forest Service
press releases, and in the mismatch between
rhetoric and action so striking in Abdnor's
House speech delivered long after the issue was
settled in his favor.
One last example is illustrative. In that
spring of 1979, after South Dakotans successfully overturned the Beaver Park decision, Jim
Abdnor discussed the issue in his regular mailing to constituents (Fig. 8). Note that it sets up
a choice between a Beaver Park Wilderness or
continued multiple use for the Black Hills, as
if Beaver Park's 5,040 acres would imperil the
habitat, recreation, and timber industry of a
1.2-million-acre Forest. The map illustration,
sent out at least twice, is an illuminating bit
of misinformation, whether deliberate or not.
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Even at first glance the road less areas look
suspiciously large, and overlaying this illustration onto a map of the Black Hills confirms
this. The towns and state border are positioned
accurately, but Norbeck (shaded gray for an
unstated reason) is shown at about 200 percent
of its real size. Beaver Park, in solid black,
looms over Sturgis at about 320 percent of reality. Looking at this map, which shows only the
central portion of the national forest within
its bounding box, one might agree that a
major change in forest management was being
debated, that the future of "an active forest
management program in the Black Hills" really
was on the table. It never was, but that is not
the point; this map is in the realm of rhetoric,
not reality. It is a political mind-map.42
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